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DIALOGUE

Cognitive Processes Shaped by the
Impulse to Blame
Joshua Knobe †
In his incisive and thought-provoking paper “Cognitive
Foundations of the Impulse to Blame,” Lawrence Solan points
to a surprising fact about the cognitive processes underlying
attributions of blame. 1 This surprising fact is that almost all of
the processes that we use when trying to determine whether or
not a person is blameworthy are also ones that we sometimes
use even when we are not even considering the issue of blame. 2
Only a very small amount of processing is used exclusively
when we are interested in questions of blame.
This point can be made vivid with a simple example.
Suppose that we witness a terrible accident and then assign an
investigator to answer the question: “Why did this accident
occur?” This investigator spends many months gathering
evidence, formulating hypotheses, and considering arguments
of various types. Finally, he comes back with a definite
answer. And now suppose we tell him that we also want an
answer to a second question, namely: “Was anyone to blame for
this accident?” The investigator probably won’t have to spend
another few months answering this new question. It appears
that almost all of the work has already been done; the
investigator can simply take the results he has already
obtained, do a little extra thinking, and come up with an
answer.
†

Princeton University. I am grateful to Lawrence Solan and Gilbert
Harman for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1
Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse of Blame, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (2003).
2
Id. at 1004.
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Solan provides support for this initial intuition through
a sophisticated analysis of the cognitive processes that underlie
attributions of blame. Specifically, he shows that attributions
of blame rely in a crucial way on judgments about mental states
and about causal relations. 3 He then shows that we would
have made these very judgments anyway, even if we had not
been concerned with questions of blame.
Solan also offers a tentative hypothesis about why the
cognitive processes that underlie attributions of blame overlap
in this way with the cognitive processes used in other contexts.
He suggests that perhaps human beings first began using these
processes for some entirely separate purpose – e.g., because
they served a useful role in predicting and explaining behavior
– and that these processes then came to be used in blame
attributions as well. 4
Solan is calling our attention to a very important
phenomenon here, but I want to suggest that we ought to draw
almost exactly the opposite conclusion about it from the one he
has drawn. The phenomenon is that nearly all of the cognitive
processes that we use when assessing blame are also processes
that we use when the question of blame does not even arise.
Solan’s conclusion is that blame has had a relatively small
impact on the capacities that underlie our cognitive processes. 5
I would draw the opposite conclusion: blame has had such a
pervasive influence on our cognitive capacities that, even when
we are not specifically interested in questions of blame, we
often end up using cognitive processes that arose chiefly
because of their role in making blame attributions.
To bring out the contrast between these two conclusions,
we can return to the example of the accident and the
investigator.
Turning back to our example, once the
investigator has finished figuring out why the accident
occurred, he needs very little extra effort to figure out whether
anyone is to blame. Solan believes that almost all of the
processing needed to assess blame might already have been
needed simply to figure out why the event occurred, with only a
little bit of extra processing at the end being required
3
Id. at 1009 (arguing that blame is triggered by a combination of the
thought that an event occurred because of a person’s action and that the person should
have known better).
4
Id. at 1004 (arguing that the impulse to blame is largely a ‘by-product’ of
cognitive capacities we needed for other purposes); id. at 1012 (prescinding from any
strong conclusions about the evolutionary basis of this outcome).
5
Id. at 1004, 1012.
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exclusively for the purpose of assessing blame. 6 By contrast,
my conclusion is that the whole course of the investigator’s
work – even when he was only being asked to determine why
the accident occurred – was shaped by a concern with issues of
blame. The reason why so little additional processing is needed
at the end is that, from the very beginning, his cognitive
processes were shaped by a need to facilitate blame
assessments.
In arguing for this conclusion, I focus on the two kinds
of judgments that Solan discusses in his paper – judgments
about mental states and judgments about causal relations. 7
My claim is that the way in which people make these
judgments, even when they are not specifically being
confronted with questions about blame, is deeply influenced by
a concern with blame attributions. 8
I.

BLAME AND INTENTIONAL ACTION

Attributions of blame depend in a fundamental way on
judgments about the agent’s mental states. 9 Thus, our decision
as to whether or not the agent is blameworthy will often
depend on our judgments about that agent’s goals, about the
extent to which she foresaw certain outcomes, and about
whether or not she performed the relevant behavior
intentionally. But as Solan points out, we make these kinds of
judgments all the time – even when we are not at all concerned
with questions of blame – and it therefore appears that we use
relatively little of the processing for which we detect mental
states exclusively for the purpose of making blame
assessments. 10
A question then arises as to why we make these
judgments in the way we do. One possible view would be that
our capacity to detect and classify people’s mental states arose,
most fundamentally, from a need to predict and explain
behavior. Then, given that we already had this capacity in
place, we began using it in blame assessments as well.

6

Id. at 1004.
Solan, supra note 1, at 1014-20.
8
Id. at 1018-20 (on mental states); id. at 1014-17 (on causal relations).
9
Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126
PSYCHOL. BULL. 556, 566-68 (2000).
10
Solan, supra note 1, at 1003.
7
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But there is another possibility. Perhaps our capacity to
detect and classify mental states has itself been shaped in
certain ways by a need to assess blame. In other words, it
might turn out that our capacity to detect mental states was
not shaped only by a need for predictions and explanations, but
also (at least in certain respects) by a need to determine
whether or not particular agents are blameworthy. 11
Take the distinction between behaviors that are
performed “intentionally” and those that are performed
“unintentionally.” One hypothesis would be that this
distinction was shaped primarily by a need for prediction and
explanation. An alternative hypothesis would be that the
distinction itself was shaped in part by a need for assessments
of blame.
The best way to decide between these two hypotheses
would be to look in detail at the criteria that people use when
they are trying to figure out whether a given behavior was
performed intentionally or unintentionally. Then we could see
whether these criteria make better sense (a) as part of an
attempt to predict and explain behavior or (b) as part of an
attempt to assess blame. I have addressed this issue in a
number of recent publications; 12 here we only have space for a
highly compressed version of the argument.
When we want to investigate the criteria that people
use in determining whether or not a behavior was performed
intentionally, one of the most helpful methods is to look at
people’s intuitions regarding particular cases. For example, let
us consider the following story:
A lieutenant was talking with a sergeant. The lieutenant gave the
order: ‘Send your squad to the top of Thompson Hill.’
The sergeant said: ‘But if I send my squad to the top of Thompson
Hill, we’ll be moving the men directly into the enemy’s line of fire.
Some of them will surely be killed!’
The lieutenant answered: ‘Look, I know that they’ll be in the line of
fire, and I know that some of them will be killed. But I don’t care at

11
For a more radical view, see Kristin Andrews, Folk Psychology is not a
Predictive Device (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that our
capacity to detect mental states was not shaped, even primarily, by need for
prediction).
12
See, e.g., Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary
Language, 63 ANALYSIS 190 (2003) [hereinafter Knobe, Intentional Action and Side
Effects]; Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental
Investigation, 16 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 309 (2003).
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all about what happens to our soldiers. All I care about is taking
control of Thompson Hill.’
The squad was sent to the top of Thompson Hill. As expected, the
soldiers were moved into the enemy’s line of fire, and some of them
were killed. 13

Confronted with this story, most people say that the
lieutenant intentionally put the soldiers into the line of fire.
But suppose that we make a small change in the story,
changing the effect of the lieutenant’s behavior from something
bad to something good. The story then becomes:
A lieutenant was talking with a sergeant. The lieutenant gave the
order: ‘Send your squad to the top of Thompson Hill.’
The sergeant said: ‘If I send my squad to the top of Thompson Hill,
we’ll be taking the men out of the enemy’s line of fire. They’ll be
rescued!’
The lieutenant answered: ‘Look, I know that we’ll be taking them out
of the line of fire, and I know that some of them would have been
killed otherwise. But I don’t care at all about what happens to our
soldiers. All I care about is taking control of Thompson Hill.’
The squad was sent to the top of Thompson Hill. As expected, the
soldiers were taken out of the enemy’s line of fire, and they thereby
escaped getting killed. 14

Confronted with this revised version of the story, most
subjects actually say that the lieutenant did not intentionally
take the soldiers out of the line of fire. 15 In fact, in a systematic
experimental study, seventy-seven percent of subjects
confronted with the first story said that the lieutenant
intentionally put the soldiers into the line of fire, whereas only
thirty percent of subjects confronted with the second story said
that the lieutenant intentionally took the soldiers out of the
line of fire. 16
Results like these suggest that people actually use
judgments about the goodness or badness of the outcome as
part of the criteria by means of which they determine whether
or not a given behavior was performed intentionally. But it
seems unlikely that this aspect of the criteria serves primarily
to facilitate some “scientific” purpose like the prediction and
13
14
15
16

Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects, supra note 12, at 192.
Id. at 192-93.
Id. at 193.
Id.
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explanation of behavior. The most well-supported hypothesis
(at least at this point in the evolving research on the topic)
would be that the very criteria by means of which we
distinguish between intentional and unintentional behaviors
have been influenced in some way by a concern with issues of
blame.
II.

BLAME AND CAUSATION

Attributions of blame are influenced, not only by
judgments about the agent’s mental states, but also by
judgments about causal relations. 17 In general, we are unlikely
to blame the agent for an outcome unless we believe that the
agent caused that outcome. But as Solan emphasizes, people
quite often try to figure out whether or not a particular agent
caused a particular outcome even when they are not wondering
whether or not the agent is to blame. 18 After all, a proper
understanding of causal relations is often helpful in predicting
and explaining events.
This is quite a striking fact. It seems odd that the very
same relation – the relation of causation – should be used both
for assessing blame and for generating predictions and
explanations. Why don’t we use two different relations here –
one relation for assessing blame and another, slightly different
relation for prediction and explanation? Solan is careful not to
engage in dogmatic evolutionary speculation. However, he
does suggest an interesting possibility. Perhaps we already
needed a capacity for detecting causal relations (because this
capacity was useful in generating predictions and
explanations), and we then came to use this capacity for
assessing blame as well. 19 But here again, there is another
possibility. Perhaps our capacity for detecting causal relations
was itself shaped in a fundamental way by our concern with
questions of blame.
Note that we are not here entertaining the absurd
hypothesis that people’s whole capacity for detecting causal
relations arose out of a need to make assessments of blame.
The idea is simply that certain aspects of this capacity – a
capacity that presumably arose chiefly out of a need for
prediction and explanation – may also have been shaped by a
17
18
19

Solan, supra note 1, at 1004.
Id.
Id. at 1004, 1012.
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concern with attributions of blame. To test this idea, we can
look closely at the criteria by which people decide whether or
not a given agent was the cause of a given outcome. The
question is whether all aspects of these criteria can be
understood as part of an attempt to arrive at accurate
predictions and explanations or whether some aspects only
make sense as part of an attempt to assess blame.
In this connection, let us consider the following story:
Lauren works in the maintenance department of a large factory. It
is her responsibility to put oil in the K4 machine on the first day of
each month. If she doesn’t put in the oil, the machine will break
down.
On June first, Lauren forgot to put in the oil. The machine broke
down a few days later.

Here it seems at least somewhat natural to say that
Lauren caused the machine to break down. After all, if she had
simply fulfilled her responsibility and put in the oil, the
breakdown would never have occurred.
But now suppose that we add a new character to our
story:
Jane also works in the factory, but she does not work in the
maintenance department. She works in human resources, keeping
track of all the details for the employee health insurance plan.
Jane also knew how to put oil in the K4 machine. But no one would
have expected her to do so; it clearly wasn’t part of her job.

Although Jane is quite similar to Lauren in certain
respects, it seems quite wrong to say that Jane caused the
accident. Indeed, I conducted a simple experiment to show that
people are more inclined to think that Lauren caused the
accident than that Jane caused it. 20
But why do we distinguish between Lauren and Jane in
this way? Neither of them put oil into the machine, and if
20
The subjects of this study were thirty-five people spending time in a
Manhattan public park. All of the subjects received the same questionnaire. First,
they read the vignette about Lauren, followed by the question: “Did Lauren cause the
machine to break down?” Then they were asked to read the vignette about Jane,
followed by the question: “Did Jane cause the machine to break down?” Each question
was answered on a scale from zero (“no, she didn’t”) to six (“yes, she did”). The mean
rating for the Lauren vignette (M=.37) was significantly lower than that for the Jane
vignette (M=3.34), t(35)=7.2, p<.001. In other words, the degree to which people
thought that Lauren was the cause was so much lower than the degree to which people
thought that Jane was the cause that the difference is extremely unlikely to be due to
chance alone.
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either of them had put the oil in, the machine would not have
broken down. Why then do we say that Lauren caused the
breakdown but Jane did not? In cases like this one, it seems
hard to deny that our judgments about causal relations are
being influenced in some way by our beliefs about the rightness
and wrongness of particular behaviors. 21 Presumably, we are
influenced by the thought that Lauren was doing something
wrong, that she really shouldn’t have neglected to put oil in the
machine.
What we see here, apparently, is a sense in which our
capacity to detect causal relations is sensitive to moral
considerations. But it seems unlikely that this sensitivity is
somehow furthering our aim of generating accurate predictions
and explanations. Thus, although these phenomena are not yet
well-understood, it seems that the balance of evidence now
points to the view that our capacity to detect causal relations
has been shaped in certain respects by a concern with issues of
blame.
III.

CONCLUSION

Solan has directed our attention to an extremely
important phenomenon: The surprising overlap between the
cognitive capacities that we use when assessing blame and the
capacities that we use for other, unrelated purposes. 22 It
appears that the vast majority of the capacities that we use
when assessing blame are also used when we are simply trying
to figure out why some given event has occurred. 23
Drawing upon this phenomenon, Solan is able to provide
some enticing evidence for the conclusion that our concern with
blame has had a relatively small impact on our underlying
cognitive capacities. 24 The essence of his argument lies in the
claim that, since we already needed so many of the relevant
capacities for other purposes, only a relatively small amount of
additional structure would be necessary to make possible the
ability that we now have to assess blame. 25

21
For similar views, see generally Judith Jarvis Thomson, Causation:
Omissions, 66 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 81 (2003); Sarah McGrath, Causation
by Omission: A Dilemma, 123 PHIL. STUD. 125 (2005).
22
Solan, supra note 1, at 1004.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 1004, 1012.
25
Id. at 1004.
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Although future research may vindicate Solan’s
argument, it seems to me that the presently-available research
actually points more strongly to the opposite conclusion. It is
true that most of the capacities that we use when assessing
blame are also used when we are simply trying to figure out
why an event occurred. But we should not therefore assume
that those capacities were already needed for some other
purpose and then came to be used in blame assessment as well.
Another possible conclusion – and one for which I have
presented some tentative support – is that the capacities we
normally use to explain and interpret events have been shaped
in a fundamental way by our concern with blame.

